We define two families of rules to adjudicate conflicting claims. The first family contains the constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, Talmud, and minimal overlap rules. The second family, which also contains the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules, is obtained from the first one by exchanging, for each problem, how well agents with relatively larger claims are treated as compared to agents with relatively smaller claims. In each case, we identify the subfamily of consistent rules.
Introduction
When a firm goes bankrupt, how should its liquidation value be divided among its creditors? More generally, when several agents have claims on a resource adding up to more than is available, how should that amount be divided? A "division rule" is a function that associates with each such problem a recommendation for it, namely a division of the resource.
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We propose and study two simple and yet surprisingly rich families of rules.
2
When surveying the literature, one cannot help but notice resemblances between rules and our families provide formal connections between several central ones. The first family contains the following four: the "constrained equal awards rule" and the "constrained equal losses rule", both already familiar to Maimonides (12th Century); the "Talmud rule", introduced by Aumann and Maschler (1985) to rationalize certain examples found in the Talmud; and the "minimal overlap rule", proposed by O'Neill (1982) as an extension of an incompletely specified rule appearing in Rabad (12th Century) (Section 3). The second family is a counterpart in which relatively small claims and relatively large claims are treated in a reverse way to the way they are treated by the first family. It contains the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules. (These two rules are the only ones the two families have in common.)
The main ingredient in the definitions of the families is the basic idea of equality, applied either to the amounts claimants receive or to the losses they incur (the differences between their claims and their awards). For the first family, keeping the claims vector fixed, let us describe how awards evolve as the resource endowment increases from 0 to the sum of the claims. Initially, all claimants share each increment equally; they are excluded in succession and for a while, in the order of increasing claims; for each increment, all claimants who are not excluded yet share it equally; this goes on until the agent with the largest claim is the only one left, and for a while, he receives the totality of each increment; then claimants come back in the order of decreasing claims; here too, for each increment, all claimants who are present share it equally. This goes on until all claimants have returned and until they are fully compensated (Section 4).
For the second family of rules, the reverse occurs: initially, only the agent with the largest claim is present and claimants are introduced to partake in the distribution in the order of decreasing claims; for each increment, all claimants who are present share it equally; claimants leave in the order of increasing claims, each claimant leaving when he is fully compensated. The agent with the largest claim is the last one to leave (Section 5).
The richness of the families comes from the freedom in choosing where claimants are dropped off and where they are invited back in (or conversely, for the second family), and in particular, from the fact that these drop-off and pick-up points are allowed to depend on the claims vector.
We identify the basic properties of the two families. We then turn to "duality" notions. Two rules are "dual" if one divides the amount available as the other divides the deficit (the difference between the sum of the claims and the endowment). Both families are closed under duality. A rule is "selfdual" if it is invariant under duality. The only self-dual member of the first family is the Talmud rule and the only self-dual member of the second family is a "reverse" of the Talmud rule (Section 6).
Finally, we investigate the existence of "consistent" members of the families. Consistency relates the recommendations made for problems involving different sets of claimants. It says that the awards vector selected for some problem need not be revised after some claimants have left with their awards and the situation is reevaluated at that point. The constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, and Talmud rules are consistent members of the first family. Are there others? The answer is yes and we offer a characterization of the subfamily they constitute (Section 7). If we also require that when claims and endowment are multiplied by the same positive number, so is the chosen awards vector-this is the property called "homogeneity"-we obtain a one-parameter subfamily, introduced by Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006a) . (The parameter is a point in the unit interval.) We also characterize a similarly defined one-parameter subfamily of the second family on the basis of homogeneity and consistency.
The model of adjudication of conflicting claims
A group N of agents have claims on a resource, c i ∈ R + being the claim of agent i ∈ N and c ≡ (c i ) i∈N the vector of claims. Initially, N is some finite subset of the set of natural numbers N. Using the notation R N + for the crossproduct of |N | copies of R + indexed by the members of N , 3 the claims vector is therefore an element of R N + . There is an endowment E of the resource, and this endowment is insufficient to honor all of the claims. Altogether, a claims problem, or simply a problem, is a pair (c, E) ∈ R N + × R + such that c i ≥ E. Let C N denote the domain of all problems. A division rule, or simply a rule, is a function that associates with each problem (c, E) ∈ C N a vector x ∈ R N such that 0 x c and satisfying the efficiency condition x i = E. Such an x is an awards vector for (c, E). Let X(c, E) be the set of these vectors.
We use two kinds of graphical representations for a rule. First, for each claims vector, we plot in a Euclidean space of dimension equal to the number of claimants the awards vector chosen by the rule as a function of the endowment. The locus of this vector is the path of awards of the rule for the claims vector. This representation is limited to the two-and threeclaimant cases but nevertheless it is very useful for proofs. Alternatively, we plot the award to each claimant as a function of the endowment. The graphs of the resulting functions are the schedules of awards of the rule for the claims vector. This representation accommodates any number of claimants.
Other notation: Given N ∈ N , we write n for |N |. Let e : R + → R + be the identity function: for each c 0 ∈ R + , e(c 0 ) = c 0 .
Four important rules
The following are important rules in the literature. They will be central to our analysis as well. The first two implement the idea of equality, of awards on the one hand, subject to claims boundedness, and of losses on the other hand, subject to non-negativity:
Constrained equal awards rule, CEA:
where λ is chosen so as to achieve efficiency.
Constrained equal losses rule, CEL:
The next rule was critical in leading to the formulation of the families we introduce here. It was initially defined so as to make sense of the resolutions proposed in the Talmud for certain problems. The story has been told many times (O'Neill, 1982; Aumann and Maschler, 1985) but it bears repeating. In the contested garment problem, two men disagree over the ownership of a garment, worth 200, say. The first man claims half of it (100) and the other claims it all (200). The Talmud recommends the division g ≡ (50, 150).
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For the estate division problem, a man has three wives whose marriage contracts specify that upon his death, they should receive 100, 200, and 300 respectively. The man dies and his estate is found to be worth only 100. The Talmud recommends e ≡ (33 ). If the estate is worth 200, it recommends k ≡ (50, 75, 75) , and if it is worth 300, it recommends p ≡ (50, 100, 150).
5
The rule, proposed by Aumann and Maschler, can be thought of as a hybrid of the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules. It is defined as follows (Figure 1 ):
, λ} otherwise, where in each case, λ is chosen so as to achieve efficiency.
The following historical precedent, called Ibn Ezra's problem (12th Century) 6 is not as well-known, but it is the main rationale for the rule defined next, as it was for an incompletely specified rule due to Rabad
7
. It too has been important in providing motivation for the introduction of our families. A man dies whose estate is worth 120. He has four sons, to whom he 4 See Baba Metzia 2a. References to the relevant passages of the Talmud are taken from O'Neill (1982) , Aumann and Maschler (1985) , and Dagan (1996) .
5 Kethubot 93a; the author of this Mishna is Rabbi Nathan. 6 This attribution is by O'Neill (1982) . O'Neill notes several of the properties of the rule defined below. Another rule that also delivers Ibn Ezra's numbers is proposed by Bergantiños and Méndez-Naya (2001) and Alcalde, Marco, and Silva (2005) .
7 Rabad's rule is defined only for claims problem in which the endowment is no greater than the smallest claim. ). O'Neill (1982) proposed the following rule to rationalize these numbers (Figure 2 ):
Minimal overlap rule, MO: Claims on specific parts of the endowment are arranged so that the part that is claimed by exactly one claimant (whoever he is; different subparts can be claimed by different claimants) is maximized, and for each k = 2, . . . , n − 1 successively, subject to the previous k maximizations being solved, the part that is claimed by exactly k + 1 claimants (whoever they are; each subpart can be claimed by different sets of k + 1 claimants) is maximized. Once claims are arranged in this way, for each part of the endowment, equal division prevails among all agents claiming it. Each claimant receives the sum of the partial compensations coming from the various parts that he claimed.
Formulae for the rule are available (O'Neill, 1982; Chun and Thomson, 2005; Alcalde, Marco, and Silva, 2007) .
It is of interest that the Talmud and minimal overlap rules coincide in the two-claimant case, and that they also coincide with the rule based on the following scenario: each claimant concedes to the other the difference between the endowment and his claim (or 0 if this difference is negative), and whatever remains is divided equally between them (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) . We refer to it as concede-and-divide.
A new family of rules, the ICI family
Although the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules clearly enter as ingredients into the definition of the Talmud rule, the considerations underlying the definition of the minimal overlap rule seem to be far removed from those that underlie these three rules. Nevertheless, we will see that a very simple general formula exists that delivers all four as special cases.
We noted that in the two-claimant case, the minimal overlap and Talmud rules both coincide with concede-and-divide, but in fact many other rules do too. Without giving formal definitions, let us only mention (i) the random arrival rule (O'Neill, 1982) , defined by imagining that claimants arrive in random order to get compensated, and fully compensating each of them until money runs out, (ii) the version of the constrained equal awards rule obtained by first assigning to each claimant his "minimal right" (the difference between the endowment and the sum of the claims of the other agents if this difference is non-negative, and 0 otherwise), and (iii) the version of the constrained equal losses rule obtained by first truncating claims at the endowment. If there are more than two claimants, these various rules usually make different recommendations. Figure 1b , which illustrates the Talmud rule in the three-claimant case, and Figure 2b , which illustrates the minimal overlap rule, also in the threeclaimant case, reveal a striking resemblance between them. What is similar is not just the fact that their schedules of awards are piece-wise linear-many other rules exhibit this feature, including all of the rules just enumeratedbut mainly the pattern of increases in awards as the endowment increases. For each claims vector, the award to each claimant increases initially, then it remains constant, then it increases again until the claimant is fully compensated; moreover, any two awards that are increasing at any given moment do so at the same rate. For each of the two rules, each claims vector, and each claimant, the interval of constancy of his award depends on where his claim stands in the ordered list of claims.
Let us then consider all rules exhibiting these features. We designate the family they constitute by the name of "Increasing-Constant-Increasing" family, or ICI family for short (the interval in which a claimant's award is increasing can be subdivided into subintervals in which the rate of increase is constant; for the agent with the largest claim, the interval of constancy is actually degenerate), and let us refer to each member of the family as an ICI rule. Proceeding in this way is justified as follows. If the endowment is very small, differences in claims can be judged irrelevant, and equal shares make sense, as "consolation prizes". As the endowment increases, at some point, it is felt that the agent with the smallest claim starts receiving too large a percentage of his claim, so he is excluded from receiving a share of new increments. Differences in the claims of the others might still be judged irrelevant, at least for a while, and we continue with equal division for them until it is felt that the agent with the second smallest claim starts receiving too large a percentage of his claim. Then, he is dropped off too and we continue with equal division for the remaining n − 2 claimants, and so on.
We proceed until agent n − 1 has been dropped off and for a while, agent n is the only recipient. Then claimants return in the order of decreasing claims. The richness of the family comes from the considerable freedom one has in choosing the various points at which claimants are dropped off and picked up again, and in particular from the fact that these drop-off and pick-up points may depend on the claims vector.
Here is the general definition of the family. 
. .
As we will see, the reason for these relations is that, when the endowment reaches c i , each claimant should be fully compensated. Let us refer to them as the ICI relations, and let us denote by H N the family of lists
k=1 of pairs of functions satisfying them. The ICI relations are not independent; multiplying the first one through by n, the second one by n−1, . . . , and the last one by 1, gives new relations whose sum is an identity.
When agents have equal claims, the ICI relations imply that successive F k 's and the corresponding G k 's are equal. Then, these agents drop out and come back together.
For
k=1 is the same for all functions H ∈ H N , as the following calculations show:
To describe an ICI rule, it suffices to specify, for each c ∈ R N + , a nowhere decreasing sequence (F k (c))
can then be recovered from (F k (c)) 
ICI rule associated with
say, the awards vector chosen by R H is given by the following algorithm. As the endowment first increases from 0 to F 1 (c), equal division prevails. As it increases from F 1 (c) to F 2 (c), claimant 1's award remains constant, and equal division of each increment prevails among the others. As it increases from F 2 (c) to F 3 (c), claimants 1 and 2's awards remain constant, and equal division of each increment prevails among the others. . . . This process goes on until the endowment reaches F n−1 (c). As it increases from F n−1 (c) to G n−1 (c), each increment goes entirely to claimant n. As it increases from G n−1 (c) to G n−2 (c), equal division of each increment prevails between claimants n and n − 1. . . . This process goes on until the endowment reaches G 1 (c), after which each increment is divided equally among all claimants, until all are fully compensated.
Next, we show that the process just described does deliver a well-defined rule, referring to the stages into which it is divided as "steps". There are 2n − 1 of them. Claimant 1's award increases on two occasions, at Step 1 by
Figure 3: Schedule of awards of a four-claimant ICI rule for a particular claims vector.
.
, and at Step 2n − 1 (the last step) by
, for a total of c 1 (by the first ICI relation). Claimant 2's award increases along with claimant 1's award on both occasions and at the same rate, also for a total of c 1 ; in addition, it increases at Step 2 by
and at Step 2n−2 by
. Altogether then, he ends up with c 2 (by the second ICI relation). Similar statements can be made about the remaining claimants.
The schedules of awards of a four-claimant ICI rule for a particular claims vector are illustrated in Figure 3 .
The family H N is convex: a convex combination of members of the family is also a member of the family. However, the ICI family itself is not a convex family.
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Next, we show that the four rules defined in Section 3 are ICI rules. We will need the following lemma, which concerns the minimal overlap rule:
to relabelling of parts of the endowment, there is a unique arrangement of claims achieving minimal overlap. It is obtained as follows:
Case 1: There is j ∈ N such that c j ≥ E. Then, each agent i ∈ N such that c i ≥ E claims [0, E] and each other agent i claims [0, c i ] (nesting of
claims occurs).
Case 2: max{c j } < E. Let t(E) be the solution to the equation in t,
(E)] as well as a part of [t(E), E] of size c i − t(E), with no overlap among the subsets of [t(E), E] claimed by any two of these agents.
Lemma 2 The constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, Talmud, and minimal overlap rules are ICI rules.
Proof: Without loss of generality, suppose
, . . . ,
is symmetric of the sequence (F k (c))
with respect to
We show that the schedules of payments follow the pattern defining the ICI family, in the process identifying the function H ∈ H N associated with the rule. As long as E ≤ c n−1 , Case 1 of Lemma 1 applies. Indeed, as E increases from 0 to c 1 , equal division among all agents prevails. As E increases from c 1 to c 2 , equal division of each increment prevails among agents 2,. . . , n. Thus, F 1 (c) = c 1 . As E increases from c 2 to c 3 , equal division of each increment prevails among agents 3,. . . , n. Thus, F 2 (c) = c 2 . This goes on until E = c n−1 . Thus, F n−1 (c) = c n−1 . As E increases beyond c n−1 , and until E = c n , agent n receives each increment.
As E increases from c n to c i , Case 2 of Lemma 1 applies. When E = c n , agent n−1 returns. Thus, G n−1 (c) = c n . As E increases from c n , the equation to solve is i∈{n−1,n} (c i −t) = E −t. Its solution t(E) satisfies c n−2 < t(E) < c n−1 . Each increment is divided equally between claimants n−1 and n. When E increases further, the equation to solve is i∈{n−2,n−1,n} (c i − t) = E − t. 
Its solution t(E) is such that c n−3 < t(E) < c n−2 . Each increment is divided
equally between claimants n, n − 1, and n − 2. At the (n − k)-th step, as E increases further, the equation to solve is i∈{k,..
Each increment is divided equally between claimants n, n − 1, . . . , and n − k. At the (n − 2)-th step, the equation to solve is i∈{2,...,n−1,n} (c i − t) = E − t. At the last step, the equation to solve is N (c i − t) = E − t. Altogether then, in each of the intervals into which we just divided the range of variation of the endowment, all agents who are included share each increment equally.
Thus, the minimal overlap rule is the ICI rule associated with the function
If |N | = 2, the list H has only one term (F 1 , G 1 ), with for each c ∈ R N + , F 1 (c) and G 1 (c) satisfying the ICI relations-there are two of them thenbut given the dependence between these relations, we obtain a one-parameter family, the parameter being a function of c. This family "connects" the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules, passing through concede-and-divide, (which, in the two-claimant case, is also the minimal overlap rule). The paths of awards are easily determined (Figure 4 ). Let N ≡ {1, 2}. If c 1 = c 2 , the path is seg [(0, 0) , c]. If c 1 < c 2 , the path consists of the segment connecting the origin to the point a(c) ≡ (
) (this segment is degenerate if F 1 (c) = 0), the vertical segment with endpoints a(c) and b(c) ≡ a(c) + (0, c 2 − c 1 ), and the segment connecting b(c) to c (this segment has slope 1; it is degenerate if G 1 (c) = c i ). We noted earlier that the family H N is convex. Now, let S and S be two ICI rules, associated with the functions H and H ∈ H N . Then, for each c ∈ R N + , the path of awards of the rule associated with a convex combination of H and H is a convex combination of the paths of S and S parallel to the 45
• line. Each line of slope 1 that intersects the path of S also intersects the path of S . Then, we take the convex combination of these points of intersection (sometimes, segments of intersection).
Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006a) propose a family of rules indexed by a point in the unit interval. This family happens to be a subfamily of the can be recovered from only one of its paths, whereas for a general ICI rule, the kinks in paths of awards can depend in some arbitrary manner on the claims vector.
Reverse family: the CIC family
A reverse algorithm to the one underlying the definition of the ICI family suggests itself: instead of beginning with equal division and dropping claimants in succession, starting with the ones with the smallest claims, we start by giving everything to claimant n and progressively enlarge the set of recipients, adding agents in the order of decreasing claims. More precisely, claimant n is the only one in until the endowment reaches a first critical value, at which point claimant n − 1 enters the scene. Then, claimants n and n − 1 share equally each increment until the endowment reaches a second critical value.
Then, claimants n, n − 1, and n − 2 share equally each increment . . . This process goes on until claimant 1 enters the scene, at which point all claimants share equally each increment. At some point, claimant 1 is fully compensated and is dropped off. Then, equal division of each increment prevails among claimants 2 through n until claimant 2 is fully compensated, and is dropped off and so on. During the last step, claimant n is the only one left. We refer to a rule so defined as an CIC rule, this acronym reflecting the fact that each claimant's award is first Constant, then Increasing, then Constant. The family so obtained is the CIC family.
The CIC rules are indexed by pairs of functions
where n ≡ |N |, satisfying properties parallel to those imposed on the pairs of functions indexing the ICI rules. Specifically, for each c ∈ R
k=1 is nowhere increasing, G 1 (c) ≤ c i , and the following relations, which we call the CIC relations, hold:
= c n Here too, the relations are not independent: multiplying the first one through by n, the second one by n − 1, . . . , and the last one by 1, gives new relations whose sum is an identity. LetH N be the family of pairs of functions satisfying these relations.
If agents have equal claims, the CIC relations imply that these agents come in and drop out together.
CIC rule associated with
say, the awards vector chosen by R H is given by the following algorithm. As the endowment first increases from 0 to F 1 (c), everything goes to claimant n. As it increases from F 1 (c) to F 2 (c), equal division of each increment prevails between claimants n and n − 1. As it increases from F 2 (c) to F 3 (c), equal division of each increment prevails among claimants n, n − 1, and n − 2. . . This process goes on until claimant 1 enters the scene, at which point equal division of each increment prevails among all claimants until, when the endowment is equal to G n−1 (c), he is
c i Figure 5 : Schedules of awards of a four-claimant CIC rule for a particular claims vector. Let f 1 ≡ F 1 (c) and
fully compensated and is dropped off. Then equal division of each increment prevails among claimants 2 through n until, when the endowment is equal to G n−2 (c), claimant 2 is fully compensated and is dropped off, and so on. At the end of the process, claimant n is the only one left, and he receives each increment until he is fully compensated.
The schedules of awards of a four-claimant CIC rule for a particular claims vector are illustrated in Figure 5 .
n−1 k=1 is the same for all members of the ICI family, as the following calculations show:
An alternative way to describe a member of the CIC family is to specify for each c ∈ R
should be nowhere decreasing and such that F 1 (0) ≥ 0 and the sequence (G k (c)) n−1 k=1 should be nowhere increasing and such that G 1 (c) ≤ c i .
The next lemma identifies three rules as CIC rules. Interestingly, two of them are the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules, which as we saw, also belong to the ICI family. The third one is defined like the Talmud rule, which we described as a hybrid of the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules, by exchanging the order in which these component rules are applied. For that reason, we name it the reverse Talmud rule. 
with respect to A comment similar to one we made for the ICI rules applies: in the two-claimant case, the path of U θ has the same shape as for any CIC rule, but each U θ can be recovered from only one of its paths, whereas for a general CIC rule, the kinks in paths of awards can depend in some arbitrary manner on the claims vector. Obviously, each ICI rule awards equal amounts to agents with equal claims, that is, satisfies equal treatment of equals. In fact, each of them satisfies order preservation of awards: if agent i's claim is at least as large as agent j's claim, he receives at least as much as agent j does; and each satisfies order preservation of losses, which says that under the same hypotheses, agent i's loss is at least as large as agent j's loss (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) . Also, for each of them, the names of claimants do not matter, a property called anonymity. Each is also such that if the endowment increases, each claimant receives at least as much as he did initially: they are resource monotonic. Each is resource continuous: a small change in the endowment does not lead to a large change in the recommended awards. An ICI rule associated with a continuous H is continuous: small changes in the data of the problem (claims and endowment) do not produce large changes in the recommended awards. Homogeneity says that if claims and endowment are multiplied by the same positive number, then so should all awards. An ICI rule is homogenous if it is associated with a pair H = (F, G) ∈ H N that is homogeneous of degree 1 (for each c ∈ R N + and each α ∈ R + , H(αc) = αH(c). It suffices to check homogeneity of F ; homogeneity of G follows from the ICI relations.) Similar observations hold for the CIC family.
Next, we consider the requirement that what is available (the endowment) should be divided symmetricly to what is missing (the deficit):
S(c, E) = c − S(c, c i − E).

Two rules S and R are dual if for each (c, E) ∈ C N , S(c, E) = c − R(c, c i − E).
A family of rules is closed under duality if whenever it contains a rule, it also contains its dual.
The following proposition collects a number of observations pertaining to duality about the ICI and CIC families. 
Proposition 1 (a) The only self-dual ICI rule is the Talmud rule. (b) The only self-dual CIC rule is the reverse Talmud rule. (c) The ICI family is closed under duality. (d) The CIC family is closed under duality.
Proof: (a) For a rule to be self-dual, for each c ∈ R N + , the graph of the function giving each claimant i's award as a function of the endowment should be symmetric with respect to the point (
). For the ICI rule associated with H ≡ (F, G) ∈ H N , this is equivalent to requiring that, starting with the agent with the smallest claim, F 1 (c) and c i − G 1 (c) should be equal. Thus, the sum F 1 (c) + G 1 (c) is known. Since the difference F 1 (c) − G 1 (c) is given by the first ICI relation, the numbers F 1 (c) and G 1 (c) are uniquely determined. Turning to the agent with the second smallest claim, and using the second ICI relation, we deduce that F 2 (c) and G 2 (c) are also uniquely determined. Proceeding by induction, we establish uniqueness of each pair (F k (c), G k (c)) for k = 1, . . . , n − 1. But then, we have obtained the Talmud rule.
(b) The reasoning is similar. Again, we start with the agent with the smallest claim, but this time, we first obtain the symmetry with respect to 1 2 c i of F n−1 (c) and G n−1 (c). By turning to the agent with the second smallest claim, we then obtain the symmetry of F n−2 (c) and G n−2 (c), and so on. Altogether, we derive the reverse Talmud rule.
(c) Let S be the ICI rule associated with (d) The proof is similar to that of (c) and we omit it.
Consistency
Next we consider a variable-population version of the model. There is an infinite set of "potential" claimants, indexed by the natural numbers N. In each given problem, however, only a finite number of them are present. Let N be the class of finite subsets of N. Here, a problem is a pair (c,
consisting of all problems involving some population in N , which associates with each N ∈ N and each (c, E) ∈ C N a vector in X(c, E). Given N ∈ N , we refer to the restriction of a rule to the subdomain C N as its "N -component". What we call an "ICI rule" or a "CIC rule" is a rule whose components are rules as defined in Sections 4 and 5 respectively.
Our central property of a rule here is designed to relate the recommendations it makes as the population of claimants changes. Let N ∈ N and (c, E) ∈ C N . Apply the rule to (c, E) and let x be the awards vector that it selects. Now, imagine that some claimants receive their awards and leave. Let N denote the set of remaining claimants. The situation, re-evaluated at that point, can be seen as the problem whose agent set is N and whose endowment is the difference between the initial endowment and the sum of the amounts assigned to the departing claimants, namely E − N x i . Equivalently, the revised endowment is the sum N x i of the amounts initially assigned to the remaining claimants. The pair (c N , N x i ) is the reduced problem of (c, E) with respect to N and x. By definition of a rule, for each i ∈ N , x i ≤ c i . Thus, N x i ≤ N c i , and we do obtain a well-defined claims problem. We require that for this problem, the rule should award to each remaining claimant the same amount as it did initially. Our next theorem describes the subfamily of the ICI family of consistent rules. It is well-known that the constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, and Talmud rules are consistent (Young, 1987) . Thus, they are examples of consistent ICI rules (the minimal overlap rule is not consistent however.
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) To obtain a complete description, let Γ be the class of nowhere decreasing functions γ : R + → R + such that γ(0) = 0 and the function e − γ is also nowhere decreasing. (These requirements imply that γ is continuous.) To each γ ∈ Γ we associate a rule as follows. Let us denote byc the vector in R given by (F k (c))
k=1 by means of the ICI relations.
12 The first application of consistency ideas in the context of the current model is due to Aumann and Maschler (1985) . For a survey of the consistency principle, see Thomson (1999) .
13 It does not satisfy the self-explanatory property of replication invariance, as noted by Chun and Thomson (2005) . This can be proved in two ways. First, since equal treatment of equals and consistency imply replication invariance and the rule satisfies equal treatment of equals and violates replication invariance, it violates consistency. To see a violation of replication invariance, let N ≡ {1, 2} and (c, E) ∈ C N be defined by c ≡ (2, 4) and E ≡ 2. Then, M O(c, E) = (1, 1). Now, let N ≡ {1, . . . , 4} and (c , E ) ∈ C N be defined by c ≡ (2, 4, 2, 4) and E ≡ 4. We have M O(c , E ) = ( To see that indeed f is a parametric representation of S γ , it is enough to consider the two-claimant case, the logic being the same for the general case. Let N ≡ {1, 2} and suppose that agent 1's claim is c 0 and agent 2's claim c 0 . The graphs of f (c 0 , ·) and f (c 0 , ·) are plotted in Figure 7b . As the endowment increases from 0 to c 0 + c 0 , the equilibrium λ increases from λ toλ. Initially, as both graphs follow A, we obtain equal division. At λ = λ 1 , the graph of f (c 0 , ·) becomes horizontal whereas that of f (c 0 , ·) is still going up, so claimant 2 receives the totality of each increment. At λ = λ 2 , claimant 2's graph also becomes horizontal. We have a "dead interval" of values of λ in which both awards are stationary. At λ =λ−h(c 0 ), the graph of f (c 0 , ·) starts going up again whereas that of f (c 0 , ·) is still horizontal. Thus, claimant 2 receives the totality of each increment. At λ =λ − h(c 0 ), claimant 1's graph starts going up too. Since the parts of the two graphs that we now follow are vertical translates of the same curve (C γ ), both claimants receive equal The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 repeatedly exploit Fact 1 below, which is nothing other than a geometric restatement of consistency, the claims vector being kept fixed, and the endowment varying from 0 to the sum of the claims:
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Fact 1: Let S be a consistent rule. Then, for each N ∈ N and each c ∈ R N + , the projection of the path of awards of S for c onto the subspace pertaining to each N ⊂ N is a subset of its path for the projection of c onto R N + . Moreover, if S is resource continuous, coincidence occurs. (This is because in that case, a path of awards is a continuous curve; by projection, we also obtain a continuous curve.)
Fact 1 applies to our search for consistent ICI and CIC rules because these rules are resource continuous, as noted in Section 6.
Another important logical relation involves anonymity, which has to be restated for our variable population framework. In this context, this is the requirement that not only within each group N ∈ N , the names of claimants should not matter, but also that two problems involving distinct groups N, N ∈ N of the same size in which the ordered lists of claims are equal and the endowments are equal too should be handled in the same way: a member of N and a member of N whose claims are equal should receive equal amounts. The following property of a rule will be useful in proving our next theorem. Let N ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ C N , and x ∈ X(c, E). If x is such that for each twoclaimant subgroup of N , its restriction to the subgroup is chosen by the rule for the reduced problem with respect to the subgroup and x, then x should be chosen by the rule for (c, E):
The next lemma, whose proof is straightforward, is an important modelfree structural result that has appeared in numerous studies:
To illustrate the distinction, the rule that agrees with the constrained equal awards rule for any problem involving claimant 1 and with the constrained equal losses rule for any other problem satisfies what could be called intra-group anonymity but not inter-group anonymity.
16 It is presented in this form by Thomson (1999) .
Lemma 6 (Elevator Lemma) If a rule is consistent and coincides with a conversely consistent rule in the two-claimant case, then it coincides with it for any number of claimants.
Here is our main result on consistency for the ICI rules.
Theorem 1 An ICI rule is consistent if and only if it is an ICI* rule.
Proof: Each ICI* rule is by definition an ICI rule. It is consistent because it is a parametric rule (Lemma 4) and parametric rules satisfy this property.
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Conversely, let S be a consistent ICI rule.
Step 1 says that the middle segments 18 of the paths of the two-claimant components of S are related in a special way.
Step 1: There is a function γ : R + → R + such that the following holds. Let N ∈ N with |N | = 2 and c ∈ R N ++ be a claims vector of unequal coordinates. Then, the common value of the coordinates of the lowest endpoint of the middle segment in the path of S for c is γ(min c i ).
Let N ≡ {1, 2, 3} and c ∈ R N + be such that 0 < c 1 < c 2 < c 3 . Let Π 1 , Π 2 , and Π 3 be the paths of awards of S for (c 2 , c 3 ), (c 1 , c 3 ), and (c 1 , c 2 ) respectively, and Π be the path of S for c. By Fact 1, the projections of Π on each of the two-dimensional subspaces R
{1,2}
, R
{1,3}
, and R
{2,3}
, are Π 3 , Π 2 , and Π 1 respectively.
Since 0 The expression "middle segment" of a path is an abuse of language when either of the two segments of slope 1 in the path are degenerate. intersection with Π 2 is a singleton, denoted Appealing to the anonymity of S, which follows from Lemma 5 (this lemma applies because the ICI rules satisfy equal treatment of equals), we conclude the following. Let N ∈ N with |N | = 2 and c ∈ R N ++ of unequal coordinates. Then, the common value of the coordinates of the lowest endpoint of the middle segment in the path of S for c is independent of who the owner of the larger claim is (above, the owner of the larger claim in (c 1 , c 2 ) is claimant 2, and the owner of the larger claim in (c 1 , c 3 ) is claimant 3). Also, this common value is independent of who the owner of the smaller claim is (there, for both (c 1 , c 2 ) and (c 1 , c 3 ), this owner is claimant 1). Thus, there is γ : R ++ → R + as in the statement of Step 1.
If one or both coordinates of c are 0, the path of S for c is degenerate. To cover this case, it suffices to extend the domain of definition of γ to R + by setting γ(0) = 0.
Step 2: The functions γ and e − γ are nowhere decreasing. Step 3: Concluding. Steps 1 and 2 together imply that there is γ ∈ Γ such that on the domain of two-claimant problems in which the two claimants have unequal claims, S = S γ . Since the ICI rules satisfy equal treatment of equals, this equality also holds, trivially, for two-claimant problems in which the two claimants have equal claims. By hypothesis, S is consistent and because S γ is consistent and resource monotonic, it is conversely consistent (for a proof of this implication, see Chun, 1999) . Thus, by the Elevator Lemma, S = S γ for any number of claimants.
Next, we search for the consistent CIC rules. The constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules are among them, and so is the reverse Talmud rule. We will show that the consistent CIC rules can also be indexed by the elements of Γ. They are defined as follows: given by (F k (c)) 
Theorem 2 A CIC rule is consistent if and only if it is a CIC* rule.
Proof: Each CIC* rule is by definition a CIC rule. It is consistent because it is a parametric rule (Lemma 7) and parametric rules satisfy this property. - Conversely, let S be a consistent CIC rule.
Step 1 Step 3 . This value of γ(a) is independent of the choice ofc 0 . Thus, γ is well-defined. Also, by its construction, γ inherits the two monotonicity properties established in Steps 1 and 2. They imply that lim t→0 γ(t) exists. Let g designate this limit. To obtain a function in Γ, it now suffices to add −g to γ.
Step 4: Concluding. Steps 1, 2, and 3 together imply that there is γ ∈ Γ such that on the domain of two-claimant problems with unequal claims, S = R γ . Since the CIC rules satisfy equal treatment of equals, this conclusion extends, trivially, to the case of two claimants with equal claims. By hypothesis, S is consistent and since R γ is consistent and resource mono-tonic, it is conversely consistent (implication already noted in the proof of Theorem 1). Thus, by the Elevator Lemma, S = R γ for any number of claimants.
Remark 1: Given a two-claimant rule S, an interesting question is whether there is a rule R defined for all populations that coincides with S in the twoclaimant case and is consistent. If such a rule exists, it is the consistent extension of S. Instead of asking whether one can select, for each N ∈ N , an ICI rule defined on C N , so that the rule on N ∈N C N so defined is consistent (the question answered by Theorem 1), one can ask whether a given two-claimant ICI rule has a consistent extension R. This is a more general question because now the components of R relative to groups with more than two claimants are not required to be fixed-population ICI rules themselves.
We have all the elements for the answer. Since the ICI rules satisfy equal treatment of equals, if R exists, it does too in the two-claimant case. If a rule satisfies this property in the two-claimant case and is consistent, it satisfies the property in general. (This is an example of a Lifting Theorem, of the kind established by Hokari and Thomson, 2000 .) Thus, Lemma 5 applies. The proof can then proceed as before. We derive the function γ as we did. The result can now be stated as follows: if the two-claimant components of a rule R on N ∈N C N are two-claimant ICI rules and R is consistent, then there is γ ∈ Γ such that the two-claimant components of R are the two-claimant components of the ICI* rule associated with γ; moreover, its components relative to greater populations are also the components of an ICI* rule, and they too are associated with γ.
The same comment applies to the CIC rules. Remark 3: The subfamily of homogeneous ICI* rules is {T θ } θ∈ [0, 1] . This is the Moreno-Ternero-Villar family (2006a). Also, the subfamily of homogeneous CIC* rules is {U θ } θ∈ [0, 1] . 
